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Moskowitz: Exclusionary Zoning Cases

STANDING OF FUTURE RESIDENTS IN
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING CASES
DAVID

H. MOSKOWITZ*

A. INTRODUCTION

T

HE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to explore the standing of future
residents to bring suit in exclusionary-zoning cases. Exclusionary
zoning may be defined as zoning and land-use control practices that have
the effect of precluding construction of dwelling units that could house
low-income and moderate-income persons either by direct exclusion or
by raising the price of access.1 An example of direct exclusion would be
the imposition of restrictions upon the number of bedrooms in apartment
units, which would have the direct effect of excluding large families. An
example of indirect exclusion would be the effect of zoning upon land
prices, which would have the effect of raising the price of land, thereby
raising the ultimate cost of the home built upon that land or the rent
charged for apartments constructed thereon.
The persons who traditionally have standing in zoning litigation
include, first, the owners of the land and the potential developers of
the land. Since the restrictions apply to them as land owners (the
developers usually having equitable ownership), no one disputes that
they have standing.
Second, it is generally conceded that neighboring landowners to
prospective developments have standing to challenge the validity of the
municipal action permitting the development, though it has been suggested
2
that it might be beneficial to deny these persons standing. Generally
speaking, the injury suffered by the neighboring landowners is remote and
slight. However, these neighbors have been permitted standing since they
* B.S., 1957, Pennsylvania State University; LL.B., 1960, Villanova University; D.Phil.,
1963, Oxford University; member, Pennsylvania Bar. Mr. Moskowitz is a partner in
the firm of Weiss, Nelson, & Moskowitz; Lecturer in Political Science at Rider College,
and Chief Litigation Attorney for the Bucks County Legal Aid Society.
See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 781 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal
Protection, 84 HALv. L. RaV. 1645, 1645-47 (1971).
2 See J. KRASNOWlzcKI, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANNED UNIrr RESmENTLL DEvELoPMENT, URBAN LAND INsTITUTE-T.B. 52, 17 (1965). The Supreme Court recently
permitted a white tenant in a segregated apartment to challenge the validity of the
landlord's policies in regard to selection of tenants. See Traflicante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., 93 S. Ct. 364 (1972). This decision would support a claim by a
present resident of an exclusionary municipality who desired to challenge the validity
of the exclusion of others. It would not necessarily be interpreted to grant standing
to the future resident who has been excluded.
1

[189]
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represent the interests of the community as a whole, something like
private attorneys general. Consequently, if these neighbors are not
accorded standing, there is no way for the issue to be framed between
the developer (and the municipality which has permitted the development)
and the rest of the community which may oppose the development.
The question to be explored is whether future residents, as
prospective tenants or homeowners, have standing to challenge zoning
restrictions which prevent the construction of dwelling units in which
these persons would like to reside.
It could be argued that a property owner or a developer may assert
the claims of the future resident.3 However, the interests of the developers
and future residents are not exactly the same. Consequently, assuming
that the future residents have constitutional interests at stake in the
existence of exclusionary zoning, the argument may be made that future
residents should be accorded standing thereby enabling them to raise the
issues of exclusionary zoning to protect their interests. The reasons for
recognizing this standing are presented below.
There are some recent decisions in which the standing of would-be
residents is recognized. First to be considered are the cases in which
developers brought suit with future residents as additional plaintiffs.
Then, the public-housing cases brought by residents of public housing and
persons on the waiting list for public housing will be examined. There are
also cases in which standing on the part of persons desiring subsidized
housing have been granted so that these persons could challenge
regulations or statutes restricting the construction of such housing. In
addition, the recent cases brought directly by future residents challenging
the validity of exclusionary zoning will be discussed. In conclusion, a
discussion of the reasons for allowing standing for future residents
will be considered.
B. CASES INVOLVING DEVELOPERS AND FUTURE RESIDENTS
There are many cases in which future residents have joined with
developers in order to raise the issues of exclusionary zoning. Five of
these cases are herein discussed. In terms of the historical development
of the principle that future residents have standing, these cases, in
addition to the cases concerning public housing, are the first cases which
raise the issue of standing for future residents.

3Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also the discussion of
Park View Heights Corp. v. Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972) (hereinafter
cited as P.V.H.C. v. Black Jack] in the text.
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In Kennedy Park Homes Assoviation v. Lackawanna,4 a non-profit
corporation (hereinafter referred to as KPHA), which had been formed
by the Colored People's Civic and Political Organization (hereinafter
referred to as CPCPO), agreed to purchase thirty acres of land owned
by the Catholic Church. The land was located in the Third Ward of the
City of Lackawanna. KPHA intended to act as the subdivider and general
contractor of a housing project consisting of moderately priced homes.
The Third Ward was an area predominantly inhabited by white
persons, with almost all of the black inhabitants of Lackawanna living
literally on the other side of the tracks in the First Ward (clearly the
most undesirable part of the town with the highest density of population
and the closest proximity to the industrial plants). As the white citizens
of Lackawanna became aware of KPHA's intention to construct homes
within the Third Ward to which the black citizens of the First Ward
could move, opposition to the project increased.
The city council re-zoned a portion of the Third Ward, including the
KPHA site, designating it for park and recreational use. A moratorium
upon future subdivision approval was also adopted. After suit was
instituted in federal court, the city council rescinded the re-zoning
and the moratorium.
The Mayor of Lackawanna, however, refused to execute the
necessary forms for extension of the sewage system to service
the KPHA site. He justified this decision on the basis of the difficulty
of expansion of the sewage system to service areas other than those
already tied into the system. Suit was again instituted in federal court
contesting the validity of the actions of the Mayor which prevented
construction of the KPHA project.
The plaintiffs were KPHA, CPCOP, and two individuals who
alleged that they intended to purchase homes in the proposed subdivision.
The United States intervened in support of the plaintiffs. The district
court held that the city officials had acted in response to the discriminatory
sentiments of the white community, which wanted to contain the city's
5
low-income, black population in the First Ward.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion written
by former Supreme Court Justice Clark, sitting by special designation,
affirmed the ruling of the district court. The court of appeals rejected
the city's defense of its actions (the city cited its need for additional

4436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970) [hereinafter cited as K.P.H.A. v. Lackawanna], cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
SK.P.H.A. v. Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1973

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 6 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 10

AKRON LAw REvmw

[VoL 6:2

recreational facilities, its inability to afford expansion to the sewage
system, and ecological considerations), by referring to the equal-protection
rights of the plaintiffs:
Lackawanna is obligated to deal with its sewer needs without
infringing on plaintiffs' rights. Even were we to accept the city's
allegation that any discrimination here resulted from thoughtlessness
rather than a purposeful scheme, the city may not escape the
responsibility for placing its black citizens under a severe disadvantage which it cannot justify (cases cited]. The city must provide
sewerage facilities to the plaintiffs in conformity with the equalprotection clause of the Fourteenth 6Amendment and provide it as
soon as it does for any other applicant.
The district court rejected the claim of the defendants that
the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court held that "all the plaintiffs have
a personal stake in the outcome of this controversy,"7 citing Baker
v. Carr.8 The court of appeals agreed with the district court. 9 Both the
district court and the court of appeals based their decision in favor of
the plaintiffs on the constitutional rights of the persons who were seeking,
and who needed, adequate housing, rather than on the property rights
of the prospective developers.
Another situation in which local officials, as a result of pressure from
the white section of the community, prevented a development in which
blacks would reside precipitated Dailey v. City of Lawton. 10 Columbia
Square, Inc., a non-profit corporation, agreed to purchase a parcel of land
from the Catholic Church, which contained a parochial school which was
no longer being used. The existing zoning of the parcel was PF-Public
Facilities. The surrounding area was zoned R-4 Residential, a high-density
residential designation. Columbia Square, Inc., suggested a change of
zoning to R-4 in order to construct federally assisted apartments for
low-income and moderate-income persons. The city denied the change of
zoning on the basis that the city could not accommodate the increased
demand for public services that the change of zoning would entail.
The district court found, as in the Kennedy Park Homes case, that
the city officials were acting in response to the desire of their white
citizens to "keep a large concentration of the Negroes and other minority
groups from living" in the white part of town." The Court of Appeals for

6436 F.2d 108, 114.
7318 F. Supp. 669, 697.
8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

9436 F.2d 108.
10425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).

l1 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266, 269 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
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the Tenth Circuit affirmed the findings of the district court, and inferred
the discriminatory intent of the city officials from the following factors:
(1) the area involved was predominantly white; (2) the proposed housing
project was designed for low-income persons, and (3) the signers of a
petition opposing the zoning change were all white. In regard to proof
of discriminatory intent, the court of appeals stated: "if proof of a
civil-rights violation depends on an open statement by an official of an
intent to discriminate, the Fourteenth Amendment offers little solace
12
to those seeking its protection."'
In the Dailey case, the plaintiffs were Columbia Square, Inc., the
proposed developer, and Willie Mae Dailey, a potential tenant in
the project. As in the Kennedy Park Homes case, the district court and the
court of appeals based their decision in favor of the plaintiffs upon
the equal-protection rights of the potential residents.
Development of a multi-family building was also involved in Sisters
of Providence v. City of Evanston. 3 As in the Dailey case, this case
involved the refusal of the city officials to change the zoning of a parcel
of land so that a federally assisted moderate-income project, commonly
referred to as a Section 236 project, could be constructed. The plaintiffs
included the following organizations and individuals:
(1) Sisters of Providence-the owners of the nine-acre parcel, upon
which was located a high school;
(2) Interaction, Inc., a limited-dividend corporation which agreed
to buy the nine-acre parcel, conditioned upon obtaining a zoning change
permitting higher-density development;
(3) Evanston Neighbors at Work-a non-profit corporation formed
for the purpose of increasing the supply of low- and moderate-income
housing in the Evanston area;
(4) Evanston Housing Center-a non-profit corporation with goals
similar to those of Evanston Neighbors at Work, and
(5) Four individuals who were black residents of Evanston who
lived in substandard housing and were prospective tenants for the
apartments to be constructed by Interaction, Inc. They brought suit on
behalf of all individuals similarly situated.
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, the
district court found that all of the plaintiffs had standing to sue and that
the complaint stated a cause of action based on the due process and
equal protection clauses and the civil rights and housing statutes. The
reasoning of the court was as follows:
Thus simply stated the complaint alleges that the housing history of
F.2d at 1039.
Is 335 F.Supp. 396 (N.D. IM.1971).
12425
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Evanston indicates a purpose to perpetuate segregation and that in
light of this Evanston cannot deny a petition to rezone by relying
on existent zoning, absent a valid land use reason, where the effect
of this denial is to further racial discrimination. This is not in
any way inferring that a city must be rezoned to accommodate
minority groups under circumstances where the subject property
undeniably cannot carry a higher density but rather that it cannot
use arbitrary land use criteria and refuse to rezone for black
it would have granted
projects where under the same circumstances
4
a variance to an all-white project.'
Once again, the emphasis of the court was placed on the constitutional
and statutory rights of the future residents rather than on the property
rights of the landowners or developers.
In holding that the individual plaintiffs had standing to sue, the5
court relied primarily upon Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,'
which is discussed below. The court, in Sisters of Providence, found
that the standing of future residents of federally subsidized, privately
constructed housing is comparable to that of potential occupants of
public-housing projects who challenge the site-selection procedures used
for public-housing projects. Moreover, the court allowed the individual
plaintiffs to represent the class of persons who would inhabit the proposed
project and accepted proof of racial discrimination based upon the high
percentage of poor persons who are black.' 6
Park View Heights Corp. v. Black Jack'7 is the most recent example
of suits involving developers and future residents. The plaintiffs included
the following:
(1) Inter-Religious Center for Urban Affairs, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as ICUA), and Park View Heights Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PVHC), which are both non-profit corporations;
(2) Four persons who reside in urban ghetto housing, and
(3) Four persons who lived in federally subsidized, moderate-income
housing.
In regard to the individual plaintiffs, it was alleged that they wanted
to live in St. Louis County, that they had been unable to find housing in
14Id. at 404.
15 265 F. Supp.

582 (N.D. Il. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Gautreaux v. C.H.A.]. See

notes 39 and 40 infra.
16 "We believe that plaintiffs' allegation that 'Black persons ...represent a substantial
percentage of residents of Evanston who have low and moderate incomes' (complaint
p. 12) is sufficient to bring this case into the realm of racial rather than economic
discrimination." Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 403 (N.D.
111.1971).
17 P.V.H.C. v. Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972). See Collier, Exclusionapy

Zoning and the Problem in Black Jack-A Denial of Housing to Whom? 16 ST.
Louts L. Rmv. 294 (1971).
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St. Louis County which they could afford, that they would qualify to live
in the Park View Heights Apartments, and that they would be able to
afford to do so, if the apartments were constructed.
ICUA, one of the non-profit corporations, had entered into an
agreement of sale to purchase an 11.9-acre tract of land originally
located in an unincorporated area of St. Louis County. PVHC, the
other non-profit corporation, assumed title to the proposed site as
the result of an assignment from ICUA. After an application had been
made to the federal government to construct subsidized apartments, the
St. Louis County Council incorporated the city of Black Jack, within
which the tract of land was located. The city of Black Jack adopted
a zoning ordinance which precluded the use of the proposed site for
the construction of apartments.
The plaintiffs instituted suit in the district court.' 8 The defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint asserting that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to bring the action and that the controversy was not a justiciable one. The
district court held that neither ICUA nor the individual plaintiffs had
standing.' 9 ICUA lacked standing because it had assigned its interest to
PVHC. The individual plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not
personally harmed by the rezoning of the property. The district court
further held that neither PVHC nor ICUA had standing to raise the
issue of the exclusion of low-income and moderate-income persons. 20
Finally, since no building permit had been denied and no request for
a zoning change or variance had been denied, the district court concluded
that no case or controversy existed. 21 Consequently, the district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision
of the district court.22 The court of appeals held that both ICUA
and PVHC had standing to raise the issue of exclusion of low-income and
moderate-income persons from Black Jack and that they could assert the
constitutional rights of the individuals who desired to move into
the apartments. These corporations also acquired standing as a result of

18 P.V.H.C. v. Black Jack, 335 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
19 Id. at 902.
20 d.
21Id.

at 903.

22 467 F.2d 1208.
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their economic investment in the project. Their sponsorship of the
project, and the opposition of the defendants to it, is adequate to assure
the court that the plaintiffs and defendants have sufficiently adverse
interests in order to present the issues in an adversary context. The court
reasoned that there was an identity of interests between the non-profit
corporations and the future residents of the apartments to be constructed.
The court of appeals cited the other cases referred to in this section in
support of its holding.
As to the individual plaintiffs, the district court concluded that the
issues they raised were not ripe for judicial determination. 23 The court of
appeals, in reversing this holding, found that the hardship to the parties
of withholding judicial consideration compelled an immediate resolution of
this controversy.2 In regard to the individual plaintiffs, the court
of appeals concluded that they:
... [H]ave presented a strong case for consideration at this time.
They allege that they are subject to the serious consequences of
segregation in housing and education, as well as the economic
consequences of decreasing access to jobs due to their inability to
escape from the inner city.2 5
Consequently, the court's conclusion is clear:
The statistics cited by the plaintiffs indicate a great need to provide
low- and moderate-income housing in the suburban areas, a need
which Park View and ICUA are trying to fill. Any attempt to
interfere with this program may work a visible and immediate
of low- and moderate-income citizens of the
hardship on the 2class
6
City of St. Louis.
Therefore, the individual plaintiffs, the future residents of the apartments,
had standing to sue and the issue of the constitutionality of their exclusion
is ripe for decision by the courtY7
One more case in which the plaintiffs included prospective residents

23 335 F. Supp. at 903.

24 467 F.2d 1208.
25 Id. at 1216.
26 Id.

27 The United States also filed suit against the City of Black Jack in the District Court
of the Eastern District of Missouri, Civil Action No. 71C372. This case is also
pending and the case discussed above may be consolidated with it for the purpose
of trial.
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of the projects involved is worthy of discussion. 28 Crow v. Brown 29 is
especially appropriate to examine at this juncture since it is basically two
cases which were consolidated for trial and disposition. Crow and Susman
were the plaintiffs in Civil Action No. 14954. They wanted to construct
two "turnkey" public-housing projects on two sites which were located in
Fulton County, outside of the city limits of Atlanta, Georgia. The two
sites were zoned for multi-family development. Similar to the events in
the Kennedy Park Homes case, county officials refused to issue building
permits when they learned that the developers intended to construct
public housing, which would be conveyed to the Atlanta Housing
Authority. Once again, the district court found that the opposition
to the projects was based on the likelihood that the future occupants of
the projects would be blacks.30
Two prospective residents of the public housing to be constructed by
Crow & Susman, Carr and Calhoun, intervened in the developers' action.
In addition, Carr and Calhoun also instituted their own action, Civil
Action No. 15203, on behalf of all the persons on the waiting list
for public housing of the Atlanta Housing Authority.
The district court rejected the challenge to the standing of the
individual plaintiffs. 3 ' The court held that the DataProcessingcase 32 gave
the data-processing associations standing because the legislative history

not directly involve the standing of future
residents, Southern Alameda Spanish-Speaking Org. (SASSO) v. Union City, 424 F.2d
291 (9th Cir. 1970). The plaintiffs are SASSO, which had an option to purchase a
site for the construction of low- and moderate-income housing, and the officers of
SASSO. The city council had granted a change of zoning to SASSO to permit
apartment development, but the opponents of the project called for a referendum. The
result of the referendum, in accordance with California law, was to nullify the
ordinance changing the zoning of the SASSO property. While the Court of Appeals
did not invalidate the referendum, the Court did order the city to develop an
appropriate plan for the construction of low- and moderate-income housing.
After the decision of the Court of Appeals in the SASSO case, the District
Court was no longer dealing with a case in which a specific developer was going to
be granted permission to build on a specific site and in which potential tenants had
joined with this developer in a suit. The specific site owned by the would-be developer
was no longer relevant to the case. The plaintiffs were then in the position of asserting
the rights of future residents who desired that construction occur somewhere within
Union City. They were no longer tied to the prospective developer of a specific site.
Consequently, at this stage the SASSO case becomes a case comparable to those
discussed herein involving future residents in the absence of joinder with a prospective
developer.
29 Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
30
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 389 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
31 Id. at 394.
32
Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28 We should also mention, though it does
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revealed that Congress had the protection of data processors specifically
in mind when it authorized them to engage in data processing for banks.
By the same reasoning, the individual plaintiffs in Crow v. Brown were
arguably within the zone of interest to be protected by the right to
non-discriminatory housing established by Congress.
Once again, the district court based its decision for the plaintiffs on
the equal protection rights of the future residents.33 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the findings of the district court in a per
curiam opinion.3 4 The relief granted included an order directing the
issuance of the building permits sought by Crow and Susman as well
as the requirement that Fulton County officials, in cooperation with
the Atlanta Housing Authority, pursue a program directed toward the
construction of public housing in Fulton County, and specifically in
35
the suburban areas of Atlanta.
Consequently, from the point of view of the assertion of the
constitutional rights of Carr and Calhoun to be granted access to
public-housing projects to be constructed outside the racially concentrated
areas of Atlanta, Carr and Calhoun obtained relief comparable to that
achieved in cases brought directly by public-housing residents and future
public-housing residents who are challenging the site-selection procedures
of housing authorities. Crow v. Brown does not specifically fall in that
category because of the unusual factual context in which the case arose.
C. CASES INVOLVING FUTURE RESIDENTS ALONE
There are three different types of cases which have been instituted
involving future residents bringing suit without joining with prospective
developers. These are the cases that concern public housing,36 the cases
in which regulations or statutes other than zoning ordinances which
prevented the construction of subsidized housing were challenged,3 7 and
the cases involving the validity of zoning ordinances brought directly
38
by those persons who were excluded by the zoning ordinances.
The leading public housing case is Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing

33 332 F.
34 457

Supp. at 394.

F.2d 788.

35 Id. at 790.
36 Gautreaux v. C.H.A., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. 111. 1967); Banks v. Perk, 341 F.
Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority v.
Cleveland, 342 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
37
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Ranjel v. Lansing, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.
1969); Brookhaven Housing Coalition v. Kunzig, 341 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
38 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div.

1971); NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div. 1972);
Pennsylvania v. Bucks County, 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 197 (1972).
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Authority.3 9 The plaintiffs included tenants in existing public housing
projects and applicants for public housing in the city of Chicago.
The defendants were40 the Chicago Housing Authority, and individual
government officials.
The complaint alleged that:
... [S]ince 1950 the CHA has selected sites, deliberately or otherwise,
for public housing projects almost exclusively within neighborhoods
the racial composition of which was all or substantially all Negro
at the time the sites were acquired, for the purpose of, or with the
result of maintaining existing patterns of urban residential segregation
by race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
The plaintiffs were challenging the practices of the Chicago Housing
Authority in placing most of the public-housing projects in predominantly
black neighborhoods, and in assigning black persons to these projects
and white persons to the small number of projects located in white
neighborhoods.
The district court held that future residents of housing projects have
standing to sue in regard to actions of governmental officials which injure
4
or prevent the construction of needed housing units. 2 The denial of
the constitutional
violated
housing by the governmental officials involved
housing. These
public
non-discriminatory
to
rights of potential residents
by the
protected
interests
of
zone
the
within
were
residents
potential
national housing acts and the civil rights statutes, as well as the Equal
Protection Clause.
The court granted the plaintiffs the relief they requested in regard to
non-discriminatory selection of sites for public housing by the Chicago
Housing Authority and the assignment of tenants on a non-discriminatory
basis. The court selected at least three different routes to implement this
result. First, further construction of public housing by the Chicago
Housing Authority on a segregated site-selection basis was permanently

39 Gautreaux v. C.H.A., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Il1. 1967). See 296 F. Supp. 907
(N.D. Ill. 1969); 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd as to program of relief, 436
F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 953 (1970); 342 F. Supp. 827
(N.D. 111. 1972), noted in 5 HARv. Crv. RiGHTS-Cv. Lia. L. REv. 150 (1970);
118 U. PA. L. REv. 437 (1970); 79 YALE L.J. 712 (1970). See also Racial Discrimination In Public Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63 (1970).
40See Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), which has been consolidated with Gautreaux v. C.H.A., in which HUD's role in the financing of the
C.H.A.'s discriminatory practices was challenged. Comment, HUD Must Institutionalize Procedures for Determining Racial and Socioeconomic Effects of Site Location
for Federally Assisted Housing Projects, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 560 (1971).
41 Gautreaux v. C.H.A., 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. I1l. 1969), aff'd as to program of
relief, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 953 (1971).
42 265 F. Supp. at 583.
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enjoined.43 Second, the court indicated that even if the plaintiffs were not
able to sustain the granting of an injunction, the court would still have
jurisdiction on the basis that the court could grant declaratory relief."
The declaratory judgment could then be used as a basis for further
relief, including an ultimate injunction. Third, the court considered
whether or not the plaintiffs should be granted such "other and further
relief" as would be necessary, such as a more vigorous utilization of the
several different types of housing programs which HUD administers and
could use in this situation. 45 The court indicated that it had jurisdiction
to consider the possibility of granting such affirmative relief.4
The Gautreaux case is still being bitterly fought. Public-housing
construction has been halted in Chicago for several years. The court has
ordered that public housing be dispersed throughout Chicago, and
conceivably throughout the entire Chicago metropolitan area, but the
orders of Judge Austin have not yet been implemented.
A similar public housing fight worthy of reference is Banks v. Perk.47
Here the plaintiffs were potential residents of public housing who were
also challenging site-selection and tenant assignment practices. The
district court entertained the action and determined that the plaintiffs had
been denied equal, non-discriminatory access to housing. The court stated:
The revocation of the building permits for the Green Valley Crest
Drive sites constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981, 1982,
2000D and 3601d, et seq. in that it denies the Negro plaintiffs equal
protection of the laws, subjects them to discrimination on grounds
of race or color in the federally assisted public housing program
and deprives them of the right to equal access to housing on a
48
non-discriminatory basis.
In yet another case, Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority v. City of
Cleveland,49 the district court recognized by way of dictum that the real
parties in interest were the poor persons residing in Cleveland who, as a

43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id.
46Id.
47 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
48 Id. at 1179.
49 342 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
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result of the challenged governmental acts, would be deprived of the
50
opportunity of living in decent, safe, and sanitary homes in Cleveland.
Two cases in which the plaintiffs were potential residents of
subsidized housing projects who challenged the validity of restrictions
other than zoning ordinances precluding the construction of these
52
projects are James v. Valtierra5l and Raniel v. City of Lansing. In both
cases, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful. However, the court acknowledged
that the plaintiffs had standing in both cases.
53
In Brookhaven Housing Coalition v. Kunzig, a suit was brought
by private citizens of the community of Brookhaven, and joined by
several civic associations. They complained that the Government Services
Administration (hereinafter GSA), had failed to comply with Executive
Order 11512 directing GSA to consider the impact a facility would have
on the community where itisto be located. GSA had decided to construct
a large Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS) installation in
Brookhaven. The plaintiffs were not federal employees. Plaintiffs
alleged that they would be affected by the new IRS facility to be
constructed by GSA as a result of the increased demand for low-income
housing thereby created.

The plaintiffs contended that there already was a great lack of
adequate low-income housing facilities in Brookhaven and the nearby
area and that the housing required for the future employees of the
IRS facility would exacerbate the problem. In regard to the question
of the standing of the plaintiffs, the district court declared:
It is true that none of the plaintiffs are employees of the new
IRS facility, but there is no one else at present in a position to
represent the prospective employees. Moreover, non-employees may
be affected by increased demand for low-income housing and come
within the ambit of those affected by "the impact a selection will
have on improving social and economic conditions in the area." It is
be "within the zone of interest to be
only necessary the plaintiffs
54
protected or regulated."

50On February 22, 1973, in two related cases, Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan
(N.D.Ohio 1973) and
F.Supp .......
Housing Authority, Civil Action C 71-251 .......
F.
Harrison v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, Civil Action C 72-67, ......
(N.D. Ohio 1973), the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority was
Supp. ......

ordered to submit a plan to the court for the construction of public housing throughout the Cleveland Metropolitan Area.

51402 U.S. 137 (1971); See Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning,
and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1384 (1971); 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.

603 (1972); 46 TUL. L. REv. 806 (1972); 39 U. Cm. L.REv. 115 (1971); 25 U.
MIAMI L. REV.790 (1971).
52 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
53341 F.Supp. 1026 (E.D.N.Y.1972).
54 Id. at 1029.
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The court also held that the civic associations had standing.
The plaintiffs in the Brookhaven case, though motivated by the
desire to have low-income housing constructed, were in a position
comparable to that of neighbors who had opposed development. They
had both contended that a governmental act had violated their rights. The
courts readily recognize the existence of a case or controversy when
citizens who allege that their rights have been violated are challenging
an act of government.5 5 The case is presented in an adversary context
because there are adverse parties: the citizens vs. the government (and
usually the developer, or, in Brookhaven, GSA and IRS). By the same
reasoning, future residents who claim that their constitutional rights have
been violated by their exclusion can present the same type of case or
controversy in which they are adverse parties to the government. They
are citizens (of the state or nation, though not necessarily of the
municipality in question) who are challenging an act of government.
They base their claims upon constitutional and statutory rights.
Finally, we should discuss two New Jersey cases and one
Pennsylvania case in which the plaintiffs are potential residents of
subsidized housing which plaintiffs contend has not been constructed and
cannot be constructed as a result of invalid zoning restrictions. Plaintiffs
do not desire construction upon any particular site. Plaintiffs have not
joined with the developer of a particular site. No particular project has
been proposed and rejected. No building permits have been requested
and denied. Plaintiffs challnge not the zoning ordinance as it applies to a
particular site, but the zoning ordinance in general in regard to its
restrictions upon future construction. All three cases are now on appeal.5 6
In Oakwood at Madison Ave. v. Township of Madison,57 the
plaintiffs represented the class of persons who resided outside Madison
Township and wanted to reside within the township but could not do so
because the zoning ordinance of the township did not provide for sufficient

55 Id.
56 There are several cases pending in the courts worth mentioning. They are not
discussed in the text since they have not yet resulted in opinions.
(1) Fair Housing Development Fund v. Oyster Bay, 71 Civ. 328 (E.D.N.Y.), in
which future residents and a non-profit corporation have challenged the zoning
practices of Oyster Bay;
(2) Planning for People Coalition v. DuPage County, Civil Action No. 51C 587
(N.D. Ill.). in which future residents, an unincorporated association and nonprofit corporation have sued a county, its officials, and several large developers,
in an effort to require construction of low-income and moderate-income housing,
and
(3) Hispana, Inc., vs. New Canaan, Conn., Civ. No. B 312 (D.C. Conn.), in
which potential residents and non-profit corporations have challenged the zoning
laws and practices of New Canaan.
See also Molino v. Mayor and Council of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d
401 (L. Div. 1971).
5T 117 N.J. Super 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971).
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additional construction of multi-family dwelling units to absorb a substantial number of additional residents. In addition to the six low-income
potential residents, two landowners also joined as plaintiffs (though the
zoning of their particular parcels was not specifically in question).
The plaintiffs contended that the zoning ordinance of the township
which had been adopted in September, 1970, was invalid because it failed
to promote reasonably the legislative purposes of the enabling legislation
in regard to single-unit and multi-family housing for low-income persons.
Madison Township already had some low-income housing and some
apartment housing, and the township contended that it was seeking housing
for relatively wealthy persons in order to have a balanced community.
However, most of the vacant and developable 8300 acres within the
Township was zoned for large minimum-lot sizes of one and two
acres. Consequently, the number of multi-family units that could be
constructed was severely limited.
The court held that the ordinance in its entirety was invalid,58
rejecting the township's justification for its restrictive zoning practices.
The court ordered the township to prepare a new zoning ordinance that
was not exclusionary, though the standards for a non-exclusionary
ordinance were not clearly delineated. Appeal has been filed by the
defendants to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
The second New Jersey decision is Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel.59 The plaintiffs included both
residents and non-residents of Mount Laurel, as well as civic associations
representing residents and non-residents. They sought declaratory and
injunctive relief in regards to the municipality's zoning ordinance and
practices. All of the individual plaintiffs lived in dilapidated or
deteriorating housing. They represented the following classes of persons of
low or moderate income who presently reside in substandard housing:
(1) residents of Mount Laurel;
(2) former residents of Mount Laurel who now live elsewhere by
reason of the unavailability of adequate housing in Mount
Laurel, and
(3) those persons who have never lived in Mount Laurel but would
move to Mount Laurel if housing was available in Mount Laurel.
The court viewed the activities of the officials of Mount Laurel in
encouraging the construction only of homes for persons of high income.
In regard to the role of the judiciary in hearing a case brought by
persons who seek adequate housing, Judge Martino indicates that "the

58 Id. at 21,283 A.2d at 358.
59 119 N.J. Super. 164,290 A.2d 465 (L. Div. 1972).
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courts, however, must be ever watchful of any discriminatory acts of
local units of government against the rights and privileges of the poor
and underprivileged." 60 The discriminatory acts of Mount Laurel Township were the zoning practices of the township in permitting construction
of homes for persons of high income and restricting such development
for persons of low and moderate income.
The court held that the zoning ordinance of Mount Laurel Township
is invalid because:
... [The patterns and practice clearly indicate that defendant
municipality through its zoning ordinances has exhibited economic
discrimination in that the poor have been deprived of adequate
housing and the opportunity to secure the construction of subsidized
housing; and has used federal, state, county and local finances and
resources61 solely for the betterment of middle and upper-income
persons.
In addition to this declaratory relief, the court also recognized the need
for affirmative municipal action to be required by the court within
parameters established by them. 62 As a result, the court ordered Mount
Laurel Township to undertake a study to identify the housing needs of
persons of low and moderate income who either live or work in the
township and to develop a plan for the construction of low-income and
3
moderate-income housing units each year to provide for these needs.
Finally, the court retained jurisdiction to ensure implementation of the
plan.64 An appeal has been filed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey
by the defendants.
The other case which should be mentioned is Commonwealth of
Pennsylvaniav. County of Bucks.65 This case was initiated by a complaint
in equity filed as a class action by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
residents of Bucks County who were seeking housing in Bucks County,
non-residents of Bucks County who desired to live and work in Bucks
County, black persons and Spanish-speaking persons who desired to live
in Bucks County, and non-profit corporations which desired to build
housing for low-income and moderate-income persons in Bucks County.
The defendants are the County of Bucks, its Planning Commission
and Housing Authority, and all of the municipalities of Bucks County
(being fifty-four in number). The defendants filed preliminary objections
to the complaint including demurrers and motions to dismiss.
6o ld. at 175, 290 A.2d at 471.
61 Id. at 178, 290 A.2d at 473.
62 Id. at 177, 290 A.2d at 472.
63 Id. at 178-79,290 A.2d at 473-74.
64 Id. at 180, 290 A.2d at 474.
65 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 179 (1972).
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The Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County sustained the
preliminary objections of the defendants, dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. 66 Plaintiffs
appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
The complaint avers that, during the period from 1950 until the
present time, Bucks County has experienced substantial growth in
population, dwelling units and job opportunities. However, because of
discriminatory zoning and housing practices and procedures, black,
Spanish-speaking, and low-income and moderate-income persons have
been excluded from the county, confined to segregated enclaves within the
county, and have been denied employment and educational opportunities.
During the 1960's and 1970's, according to the complaint, it has been
the practice and procedure of the municipalities in the county to permit
multi-family and moderate-to-high density development in the county
only after a petitioner has filed an application for a change of zoning for
a particular project, with the explicit or implicit representation that the
project will not be for low-income and moderate-income persons, but only
for relatively wealthy persons. The effect of this practice is to restrict
housing development to housing for relatively wealthy persons.
At the present time, there is virtually no undeveloped acreage
available for multi-family or moderate-to-high density housing development in the county. None of the existing comprehensive plans and zoning
ordinances of the municipalities and none of the proposed comprehensive
plans and zoning ordinances of the municipalities adequately provide for
the development and construction of housing for low-income and
moderate-income persons within the respective municipalities. Instead of
providing for such housing, it is the prevailing practice and procedure
within the county for all municipalities to exclude such housing. No single
municipality will accept such housing as long as the neighboring municipalities in the county are not accepting their fair share of such housing.
The plaintiffs in Commonwealth v. County of Bucks argue that the
effect of restricting the availability of land for multi-family and
moderate-to-high density development, and of making such land available
for such development only after requests for specific changes of zoning,
has been and is to limit the supply of such land, thereby increasing
its cost so that it is prohibitively expensive for the development of
housing for low-income and moderate-income persons. 67 Consequently,

Id. at 188.
180-8 1. For an extensive discussion of the factual situation that is the basis for
the Bucks County case see Reinstein, A Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 46 TEMPLE
L.Q. 7 (1972).
66

67 Id. at
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the need for such housing in Bucks County is great and persons seeking
such housing are unable to find it.
The plaintiffs further contend that the zoning practices are invalid
since they fail to promote the general welfare of black, Spanish-speaking,
and poor persons, but serve only the interests of the present residents of
the municipalities. Furthermore, it is alleged that these zoning practices
also violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution and are contrary to the policies of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania and the United States in regard to satisfaction of
needs for adequate housing.
Since this case is on appeal to the Commonwealth Court, and
since the author of this article has prepared the pleadings and briefs in
this case and has participated in the argument on appeal, this case
will not be discussed in any further detail.

D. REASONS FOR GRANTING STANDING

To FUTURE RESIDENTS
The test for determining the standing of future residents in general
is as follows: future residents have standing if (1) they allege that the
action challenged has caused them injury in fact, be it economic or
otherwise, or (2) if the interest asserted by them is arguably within the
zone of interests sought to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question. 68 Standing concerns then "the
question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
69
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
Standing has been considerably liberalized during the 1970's.70 Sierra
Club v. Morton is probably the latest word on the subject.7 While the
Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club did not have standing to restrain
federal officials from approving a skiing development in the Sequoia
National Forest, the court indicated that it was not granting standing

6

8

Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970);

Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970),

applied in Pennsylvania Environmental

Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
69

397 U.S. at 153.

Cir. 1971), in which
standing was granted to an agricultural-data newswire service concerned about a
similar service being conducted by the Secretary of Agriculture; Federation of
Homemakers v. Hardin, 328 F. Supp. 181 (D.C. 1971), granting standing to a
consumer organization concerned about a meat labeling regulation; and National
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), which was a suit
concerning the environmental policy act brought by government contractors.
71405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); North
City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir. 1970); Citizens
Comm. v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
70See P.A.M. News Corp. v. Hardin, 440 F.2d 255 (D.C.
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because the Sierra Club had not averred that any harm would be suffered
by itself or its members. 72 By inference, there would be standing if the
Sierra Club had alleged that its members would be injured by the skiing
development and that it brought the action in representation of these
members. It is quite clear, and the Supreme Court has not changed
the general rule, that associations have been permitted to assert the
rights of their members. 73
Future residents of housing projects should be granted standing to
sue in regard to actions of governmental officials which impede or prevent
the construction of necessary housing units. Standing was achieved in the
cases discussed above because the denial of housing by the government
officials involved violated constitutional rights of the potential residents
who were within the zones of interest protected by the various statutes.
Future residents are comparable to neighboring landowners, who, as
mentioned above, are generally accorded standing so that the issues
concerning the legality of the challenged zoning practices may be raised
before the court. Future residents are also private attorneys general.
Moreover, it is here suggested that it is only the future residents who
may raise the issue of exclusionary zoning in a way in which courts
are able to cope with it.
It is important to take note that there is not an exact paralleling
of interests between the developers and the future residents. Not only are
there economic reasons which may make it difficult for developers to
initiate the necessary lawsuits, which will be discussed below, but, in
many instances, it may be more practical for developers to agree to
restrictive practices rather than to contest them. Consider, for example,
the situation which arises when the municipality imposes excessive
requirements upon a developer which will affect the ultimate price of the
house which he sells. So long as the house can be sold at that ultimate
price, the developer may conclude that it is easier to agree to the
requirements and get the house built rather than institute litigation to
challenge the legality of the requirements in order to cut costs for the
future buyers of the homes. It is, obviously, the future buyers of
the homes who will suffer, since the costs will be passed along to them.
That clearly happens in terms of the increase in land prices which result
from exclusionary zoning. It is the future buyers who pay this increase
via the increase in cost of the homes which they purchase or the
rents which they pay.
It is also important to note, that in order to accomplish a change
in the prevailing system of zoning practices, those persons whose

405 U.S. at 735.
73Id.
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constitutional rights are most seriously at stake must be accorded standing
so that they can assert their constitutional rights and present their
arguments to the courts. The future residents, unless they are accorded
standing, will be denied the opportunity to contest the legality of actions
of municipal officials which have excluded them. They have had no
political impact upon these decisions because they are not residents of the
municipality. Unless the courts agree to hear their claims, they will be
denied the right to participate in all phases of the governmental decisionmaking process because it is inextricably connected with the residential
access which they have been denied.
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have emphasized the
importance of access to the democratic process where the issue to be
decided has a direct and substantial bearing on an individual's interests.74
The excluded persons would be residents if they had not been excluded.
They should not be denied standing to challenge their exclusion on the
basis that they are not residents.
The objection might be made that the future residents cannot be
granted standing to challenge zoning ordinances because these ordinances
do not apply to them directly but rather restrict the activities of others,
to-wit, the landowners and developers. If this type of objection were
accepted, it would have a chilling effect in many situations. For example,
once the Equal Rights Amendment is adopted, presumably the statutes
limiting the hiring of female employees will be invalid. However, the
statutes restrict employers and not employees. But it is the female job
seekers who will want to have the statutes invalidated. The employers
may not care. Similarly, the abortion statutes apply to doctors and not to
the women who may want an abortion. The Supreme Court granted
standing in the cases challenging the constitutionality of these statutes to
the would-not-be mothers rather than the doctors, even though the
criminal penalties would only apply to the latter rather than the former 5
This same reasoning would apply to the question of the ripeness of
a claim by the potential resident. Obviously, he cannot present a claim
that is ripe in the sense of the application for a building permit and the

74

See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 336 (1972); Phoenix v. Kolodziezski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v. Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
75
Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct 739 (1973).
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refusal thereof. His claim would be ripe once he has been excluded,
assuming that he has standing to challenge the invalidity of his exclusion. 76
The basic issue is whether those persons who have been excluded
may challenge the basis for their exclusion, in addition to the challenge
which may be brought by the landowner who proposes a particular
project. The landowner, while he may assert their interests, cannot
represent their interests completely. In any event, exclusionary zoning not
only involves the denial to a landowner of the right to use his property but
also has an impact upon the future residents who are being denied access
to a given area. Their rights have been implicitly recognized by the
landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 7
The decision in In re Girsh78 is particularly instructive. Joseph Girsh
wanted to construct two luxury apartment houses on a 7.7-acre tract in
Nether Providence Township. The tract was zoned R-1 Residential, which
required minimum lot sizes of one-half acre. Apartment buildings, although
not expressly prohibited, were not provided for in the zoning ordinance.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Nether Providence
Township could not preclude apartment development throughout the
entire township. The township could not prevent future growth. The
majority opinion (in which two other justices concurred), per Mr. Justice
Roberts, bases the decision upon the rights of those persons who have
been excluded. 79 The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Bell bases the
finding of unconstitutionality upon private property rights of the
landowner. 8° The Supreme Court ordered the township to provide for
the development of multi-family units within the township.&

76 See generally, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154 (1971). The Supreme Court permitted law students to challenge questions asked
for admission to the bar even though "There has been no showing that any applicant
for admission to the New York Bar has been denied admission either because of his
answers to these or any similar questions, or because of his refusal to answer them."
Id. at 165.

Similarly, a potential resident should be granted standing on the basis that he
has been unconstitutionally excluded, and he should be able to state his claim even
though he has never been denied a permit and never even has requested a permit or
change of zoning which, since he is not a developer, he would have no occasion
to request
77
In re Kit-Mar Bldrs., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237,
263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965). See also Ayer, The Punitive Law of Standing in Land Use Disputes:
Notes From A Dark Continent, 55 IOWA L. REV. 344 (1969); Foss, Interested Third
Partiesin Zoning, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 16 (1959).
78
In.re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
- Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397.
8o id.at 246, 263 A.2d at 399.
8 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395.
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The greatest difficulty in the Girsh case is the problem of appropriate
relief. When the developer is the plaintiff, the Court is confronted with
the necessity of deciding whether or not to grant approval to the
developer of the project he proposes. If the Court requires that the project
be approved (by ordering that a permit be issued to the developer), then
the municipality may be stuck with an undesired project at its most
undesirable location. If, on the other hand, the Court invalidates the
zoning restriction, and the municipality is ordered to provide for housing
at some locations within the municipality, then the municipality will
probably not select the developer's parcel (as was the result after the
decision in the Girsh case).82 Consequently, the developer will have
wasted his time and funds, and his competitors will receive the benefits.
The effect will be to discourage exclusionary-zoning cases.
This problem is symptomatic of the entire range of difficulties
inherent in judicial consideration of single-development cases. Exclusionary zoning cannot be eliminated, as far as the effect on the persons
excluded is concerned, by concentrating on the right of a developer to
construct a particular project. The Girsh case, then, fails to resolve
the problem of exclusionary zoning, for the following reasons:
1. The Girsh decision, of which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
appears to be quite aware, does not cope with the problem of the lack
of comprehensive planning. Single-development decision-making cannot
provide for a comprehensive system of land development. The court can
only act when private litigants bring the case into court, and there
are great limitations upon builders doing so.
2. The courts cannot cope with the problems potentially presented
by the location at which the developer proposes to build his project.
If the municipality is exclusionary, one possible result is to allow
construction at whatever location the developer proposes. Since the
developer may have purchased the lowest-priced parcel available in
the municipality, this may be an undesirable site for apartments (by
reason of poor highway access, for example). If the court allows the
township to review desirability of particular locations after the finding of
exclusivity, then the developer-litigant will probably not be favored with
selection of his site (which will discourage future litigation).8
3. By focusing on particular projects, the court is not able to
consider regional interests and the satisfaction of regional needs. That

8

2Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA.

L. REv. 1029, 1080 (1972).
83I d. This actually happened to Joseph Girsh when Nether Providence Township
selected sites other than his for multi-family development.
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such needs exist will usually be self-evident. That these needs should be
satisfied at this particular location will probably be difficult to determine
in the context of a particular project.84
4. Moreover, in the context of a proposed project and a single
municipality, the court is not inclined to focus on the determination of
the "fair share" of the regional needs being satisfied by a single
municipality.n Unless regional planning is pursued, or ordered by the
court in an appropriate case, the court can neither determine the propriety
of a particular project, nor the necessity of the municipality in question
being required to absorb further construction which it does not desire.
5. The Girsh case does not deal with the problem of the increase
in land costs as a result of the general, extensive restrictions upon
development. Housing and apartments become more expensive as a result
of the artificial monopoly created by zoning. These expenses are passed
on to the future residents, who are thereby adversely affected.
6. If the developer is a large developer, he will be reluctant to
institute litigation to build one project when he knows that the
municipality may lose that case but will ensure that he does not meet
with favorable treatment toward any of his later projects. If the
developer is a small developer, he will not be able to afford the loss
of time and the expense involved in litigation.
7. Unless developers are certain of the availability of land, it makes
no sense for them to spend the time, effort, and money to attempt to
work out the financial details for the construction of dwelling units.
8. Consideration of individual developments does not allow the court
to weigh appropriately, and, of course, the municipality never has done so
in an exclusionary-zoning case, the specific location of the proposed
apartment buildings, the number of units, the appropriate amount of land
coverage or building height, the setbacks and the other regulations.8 It
might be answered that the township will be able to control these after the
decision of the court, but that is exactly the problem. A builder who wins

84 Township

of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc ........ Com. Ct....... 300 A.2d 107
(1973). Here three judges were willing to grant the developer a building permit for
his particular site and three judges were unwilling to do so. Yet all the judges did
appear to agree that the township was exclusionary and that the zoning ordinance
was invalid.
8
5The Commonwealth Court also divided on the question of the "fair share" for
Williston Township in the Chesterdale case. The three judges who concluded that the
township was not accepting its fair share, even though the township had vacant
ground zoned for apartment construction, did not indicate how the "fair share" is
determined.
8617he disagreement among the judges in the Chesterdale case is at least in part a
result of the lack of information in regard to the factors mentioned in the text.
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a case such as the Girsh case cannot expect a friendly reception from
the
7
township, even if he is successful in getting his property rezoned.8
9. Consideration of the effect of the zoning restriction upon a
particular project fails to cope with all the ancillary problems of onerous
subdivision regulations and land development controls which have the
effect of increasing the ultimate cost to the home buyer or tenant.
10. Even if the developer wins his case, the municipality can harass
him in a multitude of ways. The developer will need the municipality's
cooperation in review of his development plans, street layout, drainage
facilities, sanitary facilities, building location, etc. An irate municipality
can make life difficult, if not impossible, for the developer. Delay alone,
which often can be several months or years, may be enough to kill
a proposed project.
11. The Girsh decision allows the municipality to designate specific
sites. Once these sites are so designated, the cost of acquisition of these
sites becomes too high to enable construction of low-income and
moderate-income housing. The inflation in value is the direct result of
the dearth of sites available for multi-family development.
12. As a corollary to the above, it is precisely in those locations
where the present residents would least desire to have future apartment
development that, from a planning point of view, this development is
most desirable. In other words, it is in the established residential areas
that future apartments should be built rather than at the locations
where apartments meet with the least resistance, near indusrial or
commercial properties. This is especially important from the point
of view of economic and racial integration.
13. In summary, consideration of the developer's right to build
distorts the real question before the court. It raises the issues of racial
and economic discrimination in an oblique fashion. It requires that the
excluded wait for a developer to not only propose a project but to also
litigate the prohibition upon his constructing such a project. It requires

87 This has been the experience of Crow and Susman in attempting to obtain sewerage

service for one of the projects for which a building permit was obtained as a result
of the decision in Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972). See Crow v. Brown,
332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga., 1971) (Order of the District Court subsequent to
Decision of the Court of Appeals).
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that the rights of the excluded be dependent upon the fortuity of a claim
to be made by a third party. It ignores the general pervasive impact of
the overall restrictions in an entire region.
Those who have been excluded have little reason to expect that
developers will be responsive to their needs and best interests. They will
probably find that projects which are designed for poor persons will not
be proposed for the best neighborhoods. They will probably find that
projects for black persons will be proposed near existing enclaves of
black persons. The consequences of arbitrary selection of sites by
developers will be no more beneficial than arbitrary selection of sites
by municipalities or by the courts. The interests of the developers are
not the same as those of the future residents. The issues which will be
raised and the relief requested will be quite distinct.
In any event, is there any reason to suspect that builders familiar
with the experience of Joseph Girsh will imitate his example of eight
years of litigation, three trips to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, three
cases pending, all as a means of constructing apartment houses? The
conclusion should obviously be that "the real party in interest in the Girsh
case is the future suburban apartment resident." 88 It is only the future
apartment resident who can present to the court a broader point of view
that will allow the court to consider all the potential sites. The point of
focus in the Girsh case is clearly not on the use of a particular piece
of real estate but is rather on the effect on potential future residents and
their relationship to the municipality. The court notes: "in refusing to
allow apartment development as part of its zoning scheme, Appellee has
in effect decided to zone out the people who would be able to live in
the township if apartments were available." 8 9
It is access to the housing market, to living on the available vacant
real estate, that is involved in the Girsh case. In fact, this is involved in
almost all of the cases in which the courts have invalidated restrictions
upon land use that prevent construction of housing. Regardless of
whether the theory is that exclusionary zoning is invalid per se, or that
exclusionary zoning violates the equal protection clause, or that exclusionary zoning violates the due-process clause, the courts must answer the
following questions: Who has been excluded? Who has been denied equal
protection? Due process for whom? The answers are clear. It is the rights
of the persons who have been excluded which are basically at stake.

8Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 DICKL L.
REv. 634, 651 (1970).
89 In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 242, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (1970).
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E. CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, it appears that the time is ripe for
the courts to recognize that the future residents of housing projects which
are not being built as a result of invalid governmental restrictions be
granted standing by which to challenge the validity of these restrictions.
The most effective method in which the validity of exclusionary zoning
may be examined by the courts is by a direct challenge brought by the
persons who have been most grievously affected by the restrictive zoning
practices. To date, most of the exclusionary zoning cases have been
brought by developers, who in some cases were joined by future potential
residents. However, the trend of the future would seem to be toward
granting standing to those persons who have been excluded as a result of
invalid governmental actions so that they can institute suit directly and
obtain relief that rectifies the violation of their constitutional rights.
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